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than bear the large abatement costs associated with reducing their GHG emission levels.
The perception is that the marginal cost of abatement for agriculture is less than that for
other sectors (McCarl and Schneider, 2000). Thus, farmers may be able to profit by
selling credits for activities that sequester carbon. An example of such a transaction was
the purchase of carbon credits from Iowa farmers who adopted no-till by a consortium of
Canadian energy companies (GEMCO) (Lessiter, 1999). Whether the development of a
carbon credit market will affect the management decisions of an Ontario crop farmer is
the focus of this study.
Implications and Conclusions
he profit maximizing situation for the representative Ontario crop farmer involved
growing 200 acres of corn, 100 acres of soybeans and 100 acres of winter wheat
under conventional tillage. The net farm return was $54,239 under this base scenario for a
400 acre farm and 59 tons of carbon was sequestered. The presence of a carbon market
and the subsequent ability to sell carbon credits will increase revenues but by less than
$1.50 per acre at optimistic carbon prices of $10 per ton. When the market price of carbon
reaches $191 per ton, the farmer is willing to switch from conventional tillage to no-till
since the value of the carbon credit is sufficient to cover the loss in income. Increasing all
crop prices will increase the difference in relative profitability between tillage systems
and will therefore increase the threshold price. Changes in the mix of crops grown within
a rotation with fixed crop prices will only occur with carbon prices in excess of $1,000 per
ton given the small relative differences in carbon sequestration ability between crops
considered. Using alternative carbon sequestration coefficients generated from the
Century biophysical simulation model rather than from local experimental data, the
threshold carbon price inducing a change in tillage system falls to $151 per ton. In
addition, forage would be the best option with a carbon price of $51 per ton. Given that
present market prices for carbon are less than $5 per ton, Ontario crop farmers could
possibly increase revenues with their existing practices but are unlikely to change
practices in the near future.
Background
The agricultural sector generates approximately 9.5 percent of Canadian GHG emissions
not including the use of fossil fuels or the indirect emissions from fertilizer production
(Desjardins and Riznek, 2000). Of the 67 Mt of CO2 equivalents generated annually by
agriculture, less than 2 percent is through CO2 emissions, 35 percent is from methane and
the remainder is in the form of nitrous oxide (National Climate Change Process, Analysis
and Modelling Group, 1999). Although agriculture generates GHGs, it also has the
potential to sequester significant amounts of carbon. When soils are first put into
agricultural production, up to 50 percent of the carbon tied up in the soil is released
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(Rasmussen and Parton, 1994). This stock can be recaptured through practices such as
conversion of marginal land back to native pasture, adoption of conservation tillage,
reduction of summer fallow and use of cover crops (Lal et al., 1998).
Several studies have looked at the economics of sequestering carbon in agricultural
soils. Antle et al. (2001) estimated the marginal costs of sequestering carbon for three
million hectares in Montana if farmers switched from a rotation using summer fallow to
continuous cropping. Pautsch et al. (2001) conducted a similar analysis but their study
focused on the costs of moving from conventional to conservation tillage for farmers in
Iowa (nine million hectares). The marginal costs ranged from zero to $700 per tonne of
carbon depending on the level of carbon sequestered. In a comparison of the two studies,
Antle et al. (2002) found that initially higher carbon levels could be sequestered more
cheaply in Montana due to the difference in opportunity costs. However, more carbon
could be sequestered in total by Iowa producers as the price of carbon rose due to the
larger amount of farmland and the higher sequestration levels associated with the switch
in tillage system versus a rotational switch. Similar estimates for switching tillage
practices have been found for prairie agriculture in Canada by Kulshreshtha, Jenkins and
Desjardins (2000). Adams et al. (1999) estimated the average costs of carbon
sequestration associated with planting trees on agricultural lands to be approximately $25
per tonne of carbon.
These previous studies suggest carbon could be sequestered by agriculture at a cost of
$10 to $35 per tonne of carbon. Non-agricultural firms with abatement costs higher than
these estimated average costs of carbon sequestration will be willing to pay farmers to
change practices. McCarl and Schneider (2000) conclude in their review that the costs of
carbon emission reductions in other sectors exceed $100 per tonne of carbon. Thus, if the
costs of reducing greenhouse gases in the farm sector are less than the abatement costs in
other sectors of the economy, non-agricultural firms will want to purchase emission
reduction credits from farms in order to reduce their total costs of abatement.
Although there is not a formal carbon market in place, nor have allowable standards
on individual firm emission levels of carbon been established, contracts have been
negotiated. Energy companies in particular have approached farm groups about selling
credits for the carbon sequestered by practices such as no-till, suggesting that there is a
demand for emission reduction credits that farmers may be able to supply. The relative
demand and supply pressures will establish the price for the good as in any market and
that price will determine the decisions of the market participants. This study examines the
price levels for carbon that will alter the production decisions of a crop farmer in
southwestern Ontario.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues A. Weersink et al.
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Empirical Model
The optimal choice of management activities for carbon sequestration can be readily
determined within a linear programming (LP) model that considers the technical
possibilities of substitution between activities, the levels of GHG emissions from these
activities, and their prices/costs. In the LP model developed for this study, the farmer is
assumed to maximize net farm returns subject to constraints on available land (400 acres)
and crop rotation restrictions. The farmer can choose between three different crops (corn,
soybeans and winter wheat), although at least 25 percent of the available land must be
planted to each crop. The farmer can also choose to plant these rotations using one of
three tillage systems: conventional, chisel and no-till. The farmer may also decide to plant
all farmland into permanent pasture and sell the hay crop. The management choice is
influenced not only by the yields, prices and costs for each alternative but also by the
possibility of selling carbon credits associated with the sequestration levels of each
activity.
The returns and expenses associated with each of the crop rotation and tillage practice
choice variables are summarized in table 1. Yield data for corn, soybeans, and winter
wheat under each of the three tillage systems are from studies by Weersink et al. (1992)
on the basis of experiments conducted in southern Ontario. Sales of crop production are
based on respective average market prices from 1987 to 1997 as obtained from OMAFRA
(2000a). Costs associated with each crop for the year 2000 are based on a survey of
custom rates and variable expenses conducted by OMAFRA (OMAFRA, 2000b). Further
details on the differences in individual expenses between crops for alternative tillage
systems are provided in Joseph (2002).
The annual amount of carbon sequestered per acre varies with each activity.
Conventional practices involve more frequent and higher disturbance tillage than
minimum or zero tillage. By reducing soil disturbance and the rate of soil organic matter
decomposition, conservation tillage practices enhance soil carbon sequestration (Janzen et
al., 1998). While there is some consensus on the relative differences in sequestration
levels between tillage practices, a range of values have been estimated. For example, the
Canadian Economic and Emission Model for Agriculture (CEEMA) used by Agriculture
Canada, has two sets of coefficients on practices for alternative prairie soil zones and
tillage practices: one set of expert opinion coefficients and another derived by Smith et al.
(1997)  from the Century model (Kulshreshtha et al., 1999). The range in carbon
sequestration coefficients may be due to the variability in the period of measurement in
carbon change or to differences in climatic and environmental factors. For example, Lal et
al. (1998) suggest that soil carbon will increase slowly over the first two to five years of
improvements in soil management with larger increases between five to ten years,
flattening off thereafter, and reaching a finite limit after about fifty years.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues A. Weersink et al.
                                                                                                                                             ￿ 54
For the purpose of our model, carbon sequestration coefficients are based largely on a
study by Yang and Kay (2000). A research trial with a crop rotation and tillage
experiment on a Woolwich silt loam soil was conducted at the Elora Research Station of
the University of Guelph. The estimated average organic carbon contents after twenty
years and the annual rates of accumulation are listed in table 2 (columns 2 and 3,
respectively). The annual rate of change in carbon was calculated by subtracting the base
amount of carbon in the barley-barley-corn-corn rotation and annualizing it. For example,
the annual rate of carbon sequestration of 0.34 MgCha
-1 for continuous corn was found
by taking the difference between its organic carbon content and the base
(66.55 – 59.70 = 6.85) and dividing by 20 (6.85/20 = 0.34). The barley-corn rotation was
considered the base practice, as it had the lowest carbon content and was common in
southern Ontario twenty years ago.
Yang and Kay (2000) found no interactions between crop rotations and tillage
systems. Thus, the amount of carbon sequestered by a given crop under a given tillage
system was calculated by adding the annual amount sequestered by conversion from
conventional tillage to no-till of 0.13 MgCha
-1 from Smith et al. (1997) to the crop
estimates obtained by Yang and Kay (2000) summarized in table 2. For example, the
annual carbon sequestration coefficient for conventionally tilled corn was simply the
value of 0.34 MgCha
-1 (see table 2) estimated by Yang and Kay (2000) whereas the
Table 1  Net Returns for Alternative Choice Variables ($ / acre)
Tillage system
Crop Conventional Chisel No-till
Corn Yield (ton/acre) 3.65 3.46 3.43
Revenue $478.15 $453.26 $449.33
Expenses 312.17 308.37 296.95
Net returns $165.97 $144.89 $152.37
Soybeans Yield (ton/acre) 1.24 1.25 1.09
Revenue $354.64 $357.50 $311.74
Expenses 214.39 211.62 197.46
Net returns $140.25 $145.88 $114.27
Winter wheat Yield (ton/acre) 2.13 2.16 2.10
Revenue $302.46 $306.72 $298.20
Expenses 232.28 229.65 216.87
Net returns $70.17 $77.05 $81.32
Forage Yield (ton/acre) 2.75
Revenue $214.50
Expenses $130.41
Net returns $84.09Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues A. Weersink et al.
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amount sequestered by no-till corn adds 0.13 to this amount to result in 0.47 MgCha
-1 (or
0.19 ton ac
-1). The amount of carbon sequestered annually by each choice variable is
summarized in table 3. The carbon sequestration coefficient for soybeans under
conventional tillage of 0.20 MgCha
-1 was determined by taking the annual accumulation
for the soy-corn rotation of 0.27 MgCha
-1 (see table 2) and subtracting off half of the
amount that is sequestered by corn. The amount sequestered by soybeans under no-till
adds 0.13 MgCha
-1 to the value for conventionally tilled soybeans, to result in 0.33
MgCha
-1yr
-1 (0.20+0.13) or 0.14 ton ac
-1yr
-1. The values for wheat were calculated in a
similar manner and are summarized in table 3.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate carbon sequestration coefficients,
an alternative set was also used in this study. Table 3 contains estimates provided by the
Century model from Smith et al. (1997). In general, the Century model predicts lower
sequestration values, but the relative differences between crops and tillage systems are
similar to those estimated through the process described above with Yang and Kay
estimates as the base. Conventional tillage is assumed to sequester little carbon while
wheat does not sequester as much as in the Yang and Kay forecasts. The major difference
is that forage production is predicted to sequester five times more carbon under the
Century model than under the base model estimates.
Results
The base model assumes there is no carbon market. Net farm returns generated from the
400 acres are maximized at $54,239, obtained from growing 200 acres of corn and 100
acres each of soybeans and winter wheat using a conventional tillage system. This rotation
also maximizes profits under a no-till system. The total amount of carbon sequestered
with the optimal solution is 59 tons and this cannot be sold under the base model scenario.
Table 2  Rotation and Tillage Effects on Soil Organic Carbon (MgCha
-1)










Chisel plowing 64.59 0.24
Mouldboard plowing 64.87 0.26
Source: Yang and Kay (2000)Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues A. Weersink et al.
                                                                                                                                             ￿ 56
The presence of a carbon market will increase net returns to producers but the impact
will not be significant. For example, assuming a carbon price of $10 per ton, which is
significantly greater than the current market price, the farmer under the base model
solution would generate approximately $1.50 per acre by being able to sell carbon credits
($10/ton * 0.1475 ton/acre), or $600 at the farm level. It is questionable whether these
returns would be sufficient to offset the transaction costs associated with the exchange. In
order to determine the carbon prices that would induce a switch in management practices,
we first examine tillage choice and then crop rotation.
Since a chisel plow system sequesters slightly less carbon than conventional tillage
and is not as profitable, a carbon market will never induce a change from conventional to
chisel plow under the base model carbon sequestration coefficients. However, a no-till
system under the optimal rotation sequesters 0.2025 tons of carbon per acre [0.2025 =
0.19 * .5 (corn) + 0.14 * .25 (soybeans) + 0.29 * .25 (wheat)]. Over the 400 acres, no-till
sequesters 22 tons [(0.2025 * 400) – 59] of carbon more than a conventional tillage
system. Net farm returns for no-till are $50,037, or $4,202 lower than the conventional
system with the same rotation. Thus, the price of carbon that will cause a shift in tillage
system is $191 ($4190/22) per ton of carbon (see table 4).
If all crop prices increase by 10 percent, total revenues for both tillage systems rise
but the difference in net returns between conventional and no-till increases to $5,240 from
$4,202. Thus, higher crop prices increase the carbon price at which the farmer will switch
tillage systems from $191 to approximately $238 ($5240/22). Similarly, a 10 percent
decrease in all crop prices reduces the farm returns generated by crop production and
increases the attractiveness of revenue from a carbon market. The threshold price for
carbon inducing the shift to no-till consequently drops to $142 per ton.
Carbon prices will have to be even higher than the threshold necessary to cause a
change in tillage system if a farmer with a set tillage system is to change crop rotations.
For example, the price of wheat will have to increase by $44.19 per ton to $186.19 before
wheat becomes the dominant crop in the rotation and is planted to half of the available
cropland.
2 The price change will increase total revenue by $94.12 per acre ($44.19/ton *
Table 3  Annual Carbon Sequestration Coefficients (tons ac
-1 yr
-1)
Yang and Kay Century model
Conventional No-till Chisel Conventional No-till Chisel
Corn 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.02
Soybeans 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.06
Wheat 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.00 0.06 0.04
Forage 0.22 1.02Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues A. Weersink et al.
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2.13 ton/acre). With crop prices remaining constant as in table 1, the carbon price to
induce the same change in rotation will have to be large enough to generate returns equal
to this increase in revenue. Given that wheat sequesters 0.09 more tons of carbon per acre
than corn (see table 3), the carbon price necessary to induce wheat rather than corn as the
primary crop in the rotation must be $1046 per ton (= 94.12/.09) (see table 4). While
wheat prices have increased recently to above this threshold level, it is unlikely that
carbon prices would increase to the point that they have an effect on crop choices within a
given tillage system.
The impact of a carbon market may be larger if alternative carbon sequestration
coefficients are used. The results of using the sequestration estimates from the Century
model are in column 3 of table 4. A carbon price of $151 per ton induces a switch to no-
till. The difference in revenue between the two systems remains the same but no-till
sequesters 28 more tons of carbon. Note that at carbon prices lower than this value a
farmer using conventional tillage will generate small amounts of additional revenue, since
only 4.0 tons of carbon are sequestered on the 400 acres. In addition, a carbon market
based on the Century model sequestration coefficients will not affect the choice of wheat
versus corn in the rotation since there is no or little difference in the amount of carbon
taken up by these two crops under the Century model estimates.
The major difference in the carbon sequestration coefficients is in terms of the amount
taken up by forage production. The Century model values predict that a hay crop
sequesters over 100 times the amount sequesterd with the optimal crop rotation under
conventional tillage. The difference in revenue between the two systems is $20,603 over
the 400 acres. Thus, the price of carbon that will cause a shift from the base solution to a
forage system is $51 ($20,603/404) per ton of carbon. In contrast, approximately 0.08
more tons of carbon per acre were sequestered with forage than the base system using
coefficients generated with the Young and Kay estimates. The threshold carbon price was
then close to $300,000 per ton.
Table 4  Carbon Prices Required to Induce a Shift in Management Practices ($ per ton)
Assumed carbon sequestration coefficients** Practice switched
from base results* to
Yang and Kay Century model
No-till 191 151
Wheat grown
on 0.5 of rotation
1,046 n/a
Forage production 284,179 51
* Base model has 200 acres corn, 100 acres soybeans and 100 acres of winter wheat planted
using conventional tillage.
** Sequestration coefficients for alternative practices and crops with each method given in table 3.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues A. Weersink et al.
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Concluding Remarks
he results of this study suggest the potential of a carbon credit market would not be a
windfall gain for crop farmers in southwestern Ontario; these results contrast with
the findings of previous studies for prairie agriculture. The opportunity costs are too high
for Ontario farmers to change their management decisions at anticipated carbon prices,
since there are relatively small differences in the amount of carbon sequestered between
alternative practices and the land base available to sequester is much smaller than for
western farmers. Carbon prices could be enhanced by government, since carbon-
sequestering land-management practices may provide additional environmental benefits
such as a reduction in erosion and chemical use, and could well increase the quality of
wildlife habitats (Subak, 2000). However, even if the additional value of these benefits
were included in the carbon price, it would not likely change the present practices of
Ontario crop farmers.
The optimism surrounding the benefits to agriculture of a carbon credit market
regardless of location must be tempered for several reasons. First, accurate measurements
are necessary to quantify the carbon sequestration coefficients for any mitigation strategy.
Since there are large spatial variations in carbon across a given field (VandenBygaart et
al., 2002), there are unanswered questions surrounding which sequestration values to use
and who should pay for sampling. Secondly, there is a temporal variation in addition to
the spatial variation that will affect the value of the carbon. An initial switch in practices
may sequester carbon but the rate of increase declines over time so that the practice
eventually serves to store carbon rather than sequester new levels. Potential means for
designing a mechanism to account for the temporary nature of carbon sinks are discussed
by Feng et al. (2001). Third, carbon credit agreements may bring short-term revenue but
also a long term obligation that increases costs in terms of reduced management
flexibility. Finally, farmers may find themselves as buyers rather than sellers of credits if
the emission market is extended to other greenhouse gases. GHG emission levels from
agriculture are primarily associated with nitrous oxide and methane, and the impact of
these emissions on radiation balances may prove to be much greater than the impact
associated with the amount of carbon that is sequestered.
TCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues A. Weersink et al.
                                                                                                                                             ￿ 59
References
Adams, R.D., D. Adams, J. Callaway, C. Chang, and B. McCarl. 1999. Sequestering
Carbon on Agricultural Land: Social Cost and Impacts on Timber Markets.
Contemporary Policy Issues 11(1): 76-87.
Antle, J.M., S.M. Capalbo, S. Mooney, E.T. Elliott, and K.H. Paustian. 2001. Economic
Analysis of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration: An Integrated Assessment
Approach. Journal of Agriculture and Resource Economics 26(3): 344-361.
Antle, J.M., S.M. Capalbo, S. Mooney, E.T. Elliott, and K.H. Paustian. 2002. A
Comparative Examination of the Efficiency of Sequestering Carbon in U.S.
Agricultural Soils. American Journal of Alternative Agriculture 17(3): 109-115.
Desjardins, R.L., and R. Riznek. 2000. Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Budget. In
Environmental Sustainability of Candian Agriculture: Report of the Agri-
Environmental Indicator Project, T. McCrae, C.A.S. Smith and L.J. Gregorich, eds.
Ottawa: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, pp 133-140.
http://www.agr.gc.ca/policy/environment/eb/public_html/pdfs/aei/Chap14E.pdf
Feng, H., J. Zhao, and C.L. Kling. 2001. Carbon, the Next Big Cash Crop? Choices 16(2):
16-19.
Holmes, K.J., and R.M. Friedman. 2000. Design Alternatives for a Domestic Carbon
Trading Scheme in the United States. Global Environmental Change 10(2): 273-288.
Janzen, H.H., C.A. Campbell, R.C. Izurralde, B.H. Ellert, N. Juma, W.B. McGill, and R.P.
Zentner. 1998. Management Effects on Soil C Storage on the Canadian Prairies. Soil
and Tillage Research 47(3-4): 181-195.
Joseph, S. 2002. The Effect of a Carbon Credit Market on Farm Management Decisions.
Unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Dept. of Agricultural Economics and Business, University
of Guelph, Guelph, ON.
Kulshreshtha, S.N., B. Junkins, and R.L. Desjardins. 2000. Prioritizing Greenhouse Gas
Emission Measures for Agriculture. Agricultural Systems 66(2): 145-166.
Kulshreshtha, S.N., M. Bonneau, M. Boehm, and J.C. Giraldez. 1999. Canadian
Economic and Emissions Model for Agriculture [C.E.E.M.A. VERSION 1.0], Report
1: Model Description. Ottawa: Policy Branch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.
Lal, R. 2001. Soil Carbon Sequestration and the Greenhouse Effect. SSSA Special
Publication 57. Madison, WI: Soil Science Society of America.
Lal, R., L.M. Kimble, R.F. Follett, and C.V. Cole. 1998. The Potential of U.S. Cropland
to Sequester C and Mitigate the Greenhouse Effect. Chelsea, MI: Ann Arbor Press.
Lessiter, F. 1999. No-Tillers Gearing up to Sell Carbon Credits. No-Till Farmer 27(12):
14-21.
McCarl, B.A., and U.A. Schneider. 2000. U.S. Agriculture’s Role in a Greenhouse Gas
Emission Mitigation World, An Economic Perspective. Review of Agricultural
Economics 22(1): 134 –157.
OMAFRA (Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food). 2000a. Crop statistics,
http://www.gov.on.ca/OMAFRA/english/statsCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues A. Weersink et al.
                                                                                                                                             ￿ 60
OMAFRA (Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food). 2000b. Crop budgets.
http://www.gov.on.ca/OMAFRA/english/stats
National Climate Change Process, Analysis and Modelling Group. 1999. Canada
Emissions Outlook: An Update.  http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/es/ceo/outlook.pdf
Pautsch, G.R., L.A. Kurkalow, B.A. Babcock, and C.L. Kling. 2001. The Efficiency of
Sequestering Carbon in Agricultural Soils. Contemporary Economic Policy 19(2):
123-134.
Rasmussen, P.E., and W.J. Parton. 1994. Long-term Effects of Residue Management in
Wheat Fallow: Inputs, Yields, and Soil Organic Matter. Soil Science Society of
America Journal 58(2): 523-530.
Schmalensee, R., P.L. Joskow, A.D. Ellerman, J.P. Montero, and E.M. Bailey. 1998. An
Interim Evaluation of Sulphur Dioxide Emissions Trading. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 12(3): 53-68.
Sandor, R.L., and J.R. Skees. 1999. Creating a Market for Carbon Emissions:
Opportunities for U.S. Farmers. Choices 14(1): 13-17.
Smith, W.N., P. Rochette, C. Monreal, R.L. Desjardins, E. Pattey, and A. Jaques. 1997.
The Rate of Carbon Change in Agricultural Soils in Canada at the Landscape Level.
Canadian Journal of Soil Science 77(3): 219-229.
Subak, S. 2000. Agricultural Soil Carbon Accumulation in North America: Considerations
for Climate Policy. Global Environmental Change 10(1): 185-195.
VandenBygaart, A.J., X.M. Yang, B.D. Kay, and J.D. Aspinall. 2002. Variability in
Carbon Sequestration Potential in No-Till Landscapes of Southern Ontario. Soil and
Tillage Research 65(2): 231-241.
Weersink, A., M. Walker, C. Swanton, and J. Shaw. 1992. Economic Comparison of
Alternative Tillage Systems under Risk. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics
40(2): 199-217.
Yang, X.M., and B.D. Kay. 2000. Rotation and Tillage Effects on Soil Organic Carbon
Sequestration in a Typic Hapludalf in Southern Ontario. Soil and Tillage Research
59(1): 107-114.
                                                          
Endnotes
1 The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture
and Food and BIOCAP/SHHRC.
2 Details on the results of the sensitivity analysis for other model parameters are available
from the authors upon request.